The Extradition of International Criminals: A Changing Perspective by Muther, Thomas F., Jr.
Denver Journal of International Law & Policy 
Volume 24 
Number 1 Fall Article 8 
May 2020 
The Extradition of International Criminals: A Changing Perspective 
Thomas F. Muther Jr. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/djilp 
Recommended Citation 
Thomas F. Muther, The Extradition of International Criminals: A Changing Perspective, 24 Denv. J. Int'l L. & 
Pol'y 221 (1995). 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Denver Journal of International Law & Policy by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For 
more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
Recent Developments
The Extradition of International Criminals:
A Changing Perspective
THOMAS F. MUTHER, JR., EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
I. BACKGROUND
On September 5, 1995, Gary Lauck, the infamous neo-nazi publisher
and supplier of xenophobic and anti-semitic literature, was taken into
custody by German police for violating several of that country's anti-nazi
criminal laws.1 This, by itself, is not a surprising occurrence given Ger-
many's recent crackdown on neo-nazi activity within its borders.2 How-
ever, this arrest was not typical. First, Lauck is a U.S., not German, citi-
zen, residing near Lincoln, Nebraska. Secondly, he has not set foot in
Germany for nearly twenty years. How is it, then, that a person can face
trial in Germany when he is neither a citizen of, nor present in, that
country?
The answer, while complicated in its political detail, is a simple one.
Lauck, for the last twenty years, was the most infamous producer and
distributor of neo-nazi material in the world.' From his base in Nebraska,
the "Farm Belt Fiihrer" has earned a reputation of being the most dan-
gerous neo-nazi propagandist alive.' His books, magazines, and swastika
adorned contraband were smuggled into Europe through many secret
1. Gary Lauck, Supplier of Nazi Material, Is Extradited to Germany, THE WEEK IN
GERMANY, Sept. 8, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File.
2. Since 1994, eleven neo-nazi groups have been banned, with their leaders sentenced to
jail time and monetary fines. Dominick Wichmann, Dealing with a Conscience of Shame;
Don't Be Lulled Into Complacency by the Leaderless Neo-Nazi movement, CHIC. TRI.,
Sept. 28, 1995, at Al. For a description of the criminal investigation of two of these organi-
zations, see Mary Williams Walsh, Germany Bans 2 Neo-Nazi Groups, Los ANGELES TIMEs,
Feb. 25, 1995, at 5. For a detailed account of hate crimes in Germany, see generally PAUL
HOCKENOs, FREE TO HATE (1993).
3. The Bulletin of the National Socialist German Workers Party Overseas Organization,
Lauck's main publication, is published in ten languages and circulated throughout the U.S.
and Europe. Internet Used as Tool for Neo-Nazi Propaganda, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO,
May 1995, available in WESTLAW, 1995 WL 2915974.
4. Text of ADL Report The Skinhead International; A Worldwide Survey of Neo-Nazi
Skinheads, U.S. NEwswIRE, June 28, 1995, at 105 [hereinafter ADL Report].
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channels, making their detection by German officials, as Lauck himself
brags, virtually impossible.' He avoided apprehension by remaining in the
United States, where "under the First Amendment, his nazi activities are
as legal as they are illegal in Germany."8 This has been a sore spot in
German-U.S. relations for the last two decades. Eckart Wertebach, head
of Germany's domestic intelligence agency, stated "time and again we
have talked to our American friends, but they tell us there is no way
within the American legal system to stop [Nazi propaganda]
production."
'7
For this reason, Lauck has successfully avoided the scrutiny of Ger-
man police, that is, until his recent arrest in Hundige, Denmark. Under
the weight of a German sponsored international arrest warrant,8 Denmark
agreed to take Lauck into custody and, after several months of extradi-
tion hearings, turned him over to German officials. 9 During his six months
confinement in Denmark, Lauck's extradition hearing proceeded to the
Danish Supreme Court, where he was denied relief on the grounds that
his activities were illegal in both Denmark and Germany. 10 In Germany,
Lauck faces up to five years in prison for "distributing illegal propaganda
and Nazi symbols, incitement, encouraging racial hatred, and belonging
to a criminal group."1
II. EXTRADITION: LAW OR POLICY?
The process of extradition is simply defined as the surrendering of a
criminal or accused criminal by one sovereign to another. 2 Throughout
its existence, extradition has fluctuated between the blurry line separat-
5. Andrew Stern, American Neo-Nazi is prolific Propaganda Publisher, REUTERS
WORLD SERVICE, Jan. 6, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File.
6. Scott Canon, Nebraska Neo-Nazi's Work Creates Friction Between U.S., Germany,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 30, 1994, at Al. "Extremists' speech 'however despicable, is
rightly protected by the constitution.' " Louis Freeh, U.S. FBI director, quoted in, Marc
Fisher & Steve Coil, Farm-Belt Hitler Sows Seed of Hate; The US is Finally Realizing the
Threat Posed by Groups Sending Neo-Nazi Propaganda Abroad, THE GUARDIAN, May 13,
1995, at pg. 12.
7. Id. "I have great respect for the American system ... [b]ut its effects on us have
been catastrophic." Heinrich Sippel, Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution
(Germany), quoted in, Thorn Shanker, U.S. Hands Tied in Neo-Nazi Fight; Nebraska Man
Spreading Propaganda to Germany, THE TIMES, December 22, 1993, at A16.
8. Germany, through INTERPOL, distributed arrest warrants to fifteen European
countries where Lauck was thought to have supporters. American Neo-Nazi Arrested in
Europe, CHIC. TRIB., March 24, 1995, at 3. Likewise, Lauck's arrest was coordinated by a
police raid of 80 apartments throughout Germany, confiscating weapons and neo-nazi prop-
aganda. Id.
9. Wichmann, supra note 2, at 17.
10. Jan M. Olsen, Extradition to Germany Cleared for U.S. Neo-Nazi, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, August 25, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File.
11. American Neo-Nazi Arrested in Europe, CHIC. TRIB., March 24, 1995, at 3.
12. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 1
(1974).
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ing international law and diplomacy.13 Extradition agreements originally
grew out of peace and alliance treaties, where the return of one sover-
eign's criminals was a sign of friendship and co-operation, not duty."'
However, from this informal beginning independent extradition treaties
grew to a legal significance where states became reluctant to grant extra-
dition in the absence of a formal treaty. 5 With the predominance of for-
malized treaties also came the enlightened attempts at protecting not
only the sovereign interests of the states, but the rights of the individual
as well.
As the last decade of the twentieth century unfolds, it is becoming
exceptionally clear, however, that the legal framework defining extradi-
tion has become more of a burden in today's atmosphere of international
crime, leaving individual countries the task of finding ways around the
treaties that were once so important. From the apex of international law,
extradition has once again sunk to the nebulous region between law and
policy. Despite earlier efforts at codifying basic legal principles with
which to govern extradition, the international community has chosen to
keep its application discretionary.
III. THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON EXTRADITION
As mentioned above, most countries require formal extradition trea-
ties to allow the surrendering of persons to a requesting state."6 Germany
and Denmark are both parties to the Council of Europe's European Con-
vention on Extradition (ECE).17 The ECE is the most successful multilat-
eral treaty of its kind, accounting for more extraditions than any other. 8
This treaty supersedes other bilateral treaties, 9 however, leaving them as
supplementary to the broader ECE. ° In form, the ECE follows an ortho-
dox pattern, although liberalizing the earlier bilateral treaties on which it
13. I.A. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (1971). "The whole history of
extradition has been little more than a reflection of the political relations between the states
in question. Van den Wijngaert, The Political Offense Exception to Extradition: Defining
the Issues and Searching a Feasible Alternative, REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INT'LE 740, 745-46
(1993), citing M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND
PRACTICE 6 (1987).
14. Id. at 6.
15. Id. at 24-25. The question as to whether any customary international law on extra-
dition exists has been a long standing and yet unresolved legal debate.
16. Some countries do not require treaties to be in force for extradition to possible. For
example, France and Switzerland statutorily provide for extradition where no treaty exists.
GEOFF GILBERT, ASPECTS OF EXTRADITION LAW 26 (1991). Common. law countries are more
likely to require more formalistic treaty obligations. Id.
17. European Convention on Extradition, December 13, 1957, UNTS 5146 [hereinafter
ECE]. The Federal Republic of Germany, the original signor to the convention, was replaced
by Germany in 1991.
18. GILBERT, supra note 16, at 21. By the end of 1990, twenty-one states had ratified
the ECE.
19. ECE, supra note 17, at art. 28.
20. GILBERT, supra note 16, at 22.
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is based.2 1 One of the principle goals of the ECE is to assist in the
"achiev[ment] of greater unity between its members... [clonsidering the
acceptance of uniform rules with regard to extradition [a]s likely to assist
th[is] work .... Despite the legal framework of the ECE, as well as the
stated intentions of its member countries, Lauck's extradition to Ger-
many illuminates the devaluation of an international legal extradition
standard.
A. Reciprocity
Reciprocity, the notion that one sovereign will surrender fugitives so
long as its own requests for fugitives will be honored, 8 is one of the fun-
damental bases on which extradition is possible. While the text of the
ECE does not specifically address reciprocity, it can be inferred from the
preamble's reference to greater cooperation, along with the nature of trea-
ties in general, that reciprocity is assumably met by simple ratification. In
the past, the concept of reciprocity has been thought to limit the objec-
tives of extradition by giving states a legal opportunity to refuse extradi-
tion. Many view extradition, even without reciorocity, as a benefit, stating
that the best interests of both countries are to return criminals. Not only
does the requesting party benefit by being given the opportunity to pun-
ish those who violate its laws, but the requested party also benefits by not
having to house another country's criminals.2 " For this reason, reciprocity
has become a blanket concern, arising either where no treaty exists, or
where one requesting party to a treaty is consistently refused extradition
by the requested party.
B. Double Criminality
Article 2 of the ECE provides that "extradition shall be granted in
respect of offenses punishable under the laws of the requesting party and
of the requested party by deprivation of liberty or under a detention or-
der for a maximum period of at least one year or by a more severe pen-
alty. '2 5 The types of crime for which extradition is available are limited
to crimes that carry a potential sentence of one year incarceration or
more."' Double criminality, like reciprocity, has become a burden to
21. I.A. Shearer, The Current Framework of International Extradition: A Brief Study
of Regional Arrangements and Multilateral Treaties in 2 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & VED P.
NANDA, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 326 (1973).
22. ECE, supra note 17, at preamble
23. BASSIOUNI, supra note 12, at 8.
24. Parry, 6 BRITISH DIGEST INT'L L. 805-806 (1965), cited in Gilbert, supra note 16, at
26. "No State could desire that its territory should become a place of refuge for the malefac-
tors of other countries." SHEARER, supra note 13, at 29.
25. ECE, supra note 17, at art. 2.
26. The ECE's eliminative approach is in sharp contrast to the more traditional enu-
merative one, which required treaties to list all the extraditable offenses. This represents the
common trend in most bilateral and multilateral extradition treaties. GILBERT, supra note
16, at 38.
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states which are trying to extradite criminals under their laws. What has
arisen in many instances is a willingness to create general categories into
which crimes can be classified, thus avoiding the classic statutory lan-
guage comparisons which made it difficult to meet double criminality re-
quirements in the past. This section of the treaty seems to have been
wholly disregarded by the Danish court in allowing the extradition of
Lauck to Germany.
Because of its history, German criminal law has developed many
prohibitions against outward manifestations of racial hatred. For in-
stance, Germany's Penal Code provides for incarceration for the produc-
tion, showing, or distribution of specific writings to those under eigh-
teen.217 While many loopholes exist in German law affording limited
protection to neo-nazi groups, it is the most developed legal attempt at
preventing racially motivated activity in the world.2" Denmark, on the
other hand, is much more like the United States in its protection of neo-
nazi groups under the ideals of freedom of expression. While stat. 266(b)
of the Danish Penal Code makes it a crime to utter racist remarks, the
punishment imposed by that law does not exceed one year and, therefore,
does not fall within the category of crimes extraditable to Germany.29
This was tested by the failed 1988 German extradition attempt of Thies
Christophersen, who fled to Denmark from Germany to escape incarcera-
tion. 0 He was allowed to stay in Denmark on grounds of freedom of ex-
pression. However, art. 266(b) was amended this spring, giving it teeth by
increasing the punishment of these crimes to two years.2 ' This increased
sentence would allow extradition under the ECE. However, this law was
amended after Lauck's extradition hearing had already begun. There is
little doubt that if Lauck was arrested today, his extradition would not
violate international treaty obligations. However, barring retroactivity of
the statute, double criminality was not present in Lauck's case. While
Lauck's actions may have been illegal in two states, the disparity in pun-
ishments would not allow extradition.
With the increase of new crimes in the international arena, double
criminality has become an unwelcome barrier to extradition."2 For this
27. STRAFGESETZBUCH [Penal Code] art. 130, reprinted in Juliane Wetzel, The Judicial
Treatment of Incitement against Ethnic Groups and of the Denial of National Socialist
Mass Murder in the Federal Republic of Germany in UNDER THE SHADOW OF WEIMAR: DE-
MOCRACY, LAW, AND RACIAL INCITEMENT IN SIX COUNTRIEs 83 (Louis Greenspan & Cyrill Lev-
itt eds., 1993).
28. Charles Lewis Nier, Racial Hatred: A Comparative Analysis of the Hate Crime
Laws of the U.S. and Germany, 13 DICK. J. INT'L L. 241, 279 (1995).
29. "I think the most [jail time] anybody ever got [under 266(b)] in Denmark was 60
days," Elmquist, Head of the Danish Parliamentary Justice Committee, quoted in Walsh,
supra note 2, at 1.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Jonathan 0. Hafen, Comment, International Extradition: Issues Arising Under the
Dual Criminality Requirement, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REV. 191, 191 (1992).
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reason, more general notions of crime have become acceptable as meeting
the double criminality requirement, no longer relying on the similarity of
statutory language. More than just a solution to a temporary problem of
double criminality, Lauck's surrendering represents the willingness of
countries to ignore internationally recognized standards in dealing with
international criminals.
C. Political Offenses
Article 3 of the ECE provides:
[e]xtradition shall not be granted if the offence in respect of which it
is requested is regarded by the requested Party as a political offence
or as an offence connected with a political offence.33
The designed effect of this article is "[to] mix inseparably the hu-
manitarian concerns for the fugitive on the one hand and on the other the
politically motivated unwillingness of the requested state to get involved
in the international political affairs of the requesting state. '3 4 Likewise,
extradition has traditionally focused on returning political prisoners; only
later in its history did states adopt the liberalist notion of protection
against political offenses.3 5 While each country has a different definition
of political offense, most systems include not only pure crimes, such as
treason and espionage, but also relative offenses which involve common
crimes.3 6
This factor, while theoretically large in the scope of neo-nazi activity,
has played a surprisingly small role in any of the extradition proceedings
thus far. This, in large part, has to do with a statutory interpretation
excluding hate groups, such as skinheads and neo-nazis, from the realm of
legitimate party politics.37 German courts have consistently labelled these
activities as non-political, requiring neo-nazi groups to show that they
have sufficient seriousness in their efforts to influence the political cli-
mate of the Bundestag.3 8 This approach, however, underestimates the in-
fluence of far-right extremism in European and American political sys-
tems.3 9 Simply stated, the political offense exception does not apply to
33. ECE, supra note 17, at art. 3.
34. Die Auslieferungsausnahme Bei Politischen Delikten (1983); English summary, pp.
377-81, cited in GILBERT, supra note 16, at 113.
35. 2 BASSIOUNI & NANDA, supra note 21, at 312; Nancy P. Kelly, Comment, The Politi-
cal Offense Exception to Extradition: Protecting the Right of Rebellion in an Era of Inter-
national Political Violence, 66 OR. L. REV. 405, 405 (1987).
36. Different countries view relative political offenses more or less favorably in light of
extradition. See Kelly, supra note 35, at 405-407.
37. "Although willing to connect with far-right [political] parties, the Skinheads them-
selves reject the parliamentary road to power. Rather, they aim to achieve their goals
through destabilizing society through the direct application of violence and intimidation.
ADL Report, supra note 4, at 4.
38. Walsh, supra note 2, at 7.
39. For an exhaustive account of neo-nazi political activity throughout the world, see
generally PETER MERKL & LEONARD WEINGBERG, ENCOUNTERS WITH THE CONTEMPORARY
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Lauck because the charges brought against him were non-political in that
they focused primarily on the racist, not political, elements of the crime.
Another policy reason why this concept was not a major issue is that
a recent trend has been to eliminate the political offense exception en-
tirely.'0 One of the most dramatic changes in extradition law is the at-
tempt to repeal the political offense exception entirely, given its ability to
offer defenses for international terrorism and hate crimes. This tendency
is even stronger among the ECE countries, where the predominant view is
that in democratic states, criminal activity is not necessary to effect polit-
ical change."'
D. Speciality
Speciality, the doctrine that a fugitive shall only be tried in the re-
questing state for the crimes for which he was surrendered, 3 is another
aspect of extradition law which has fallen to the wayside in the hopes of
promoting efficient extradition policies. Although this principle is ac-
cepted by all states as part of the rules of extradition,'" it is the aspect
most commonly offended by requesting parties." Article 14 of the ECE
provides:
A person who has been extradited shall not be proceeded against...
for any offense committed prior to his surrender ... nor shall he be
for any other reason restricted in his personal freedom, except ...
(a)When the party which surrendered him consents, [so long as] the
offense for which it is requested is itself subject to extradition in ac-
cordance with the provisions of the convention. 3
This is a broad exception, showing that speciality, rather than trying
to protect the rights of the person, is in actuality a tool for insuring
smooth relations among countries. However, even consent is only permis-
sible when the other offenses would be extraditable. Thus, in conjunction
with the double criminality requirement, it would appear that if the fugi-
tive is charged with more than one crime in the requesting country, then
only those crimes that are criminal in the requested country could be
charged. In Lauck's case, the Danish statute covers only those crimes
which stem from racist utterances. Germany's prosecutorial power would
be seriously limited if the ECE were to be followed.
RADIcAL RIGHT (1993).
40. Justice Ministers Hope to Drop Concept of Political Crime in Europe, EUROPEAN
SOCIAL POLICY, April 14, 1994, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, News File.
41. Id.
42. BASSIOUNI, supra note 12, at 108.
43. GILBERT, supra note 16, at 106.
44. Kenneth Levitt, International Extradition, The Principle of Speciality, and Effec-
tive Treaty Enforcement, 76 MINN. L. REv. 1017, 1018 (1992).
45. ECE, supra note 17, at art. 14.
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IV. THE EXTRADITION OF LAUCK
With this overview of the extradition law under the ECE, it is appar-
ent that Denmark's extradition of Lauck may exemplify a new trend in
extradition which, if carried to its logical conclusion, would suggest that
extradition has returned to solely a diplomatic concern, merely keeping
its legal facade as a means of justification.
The extradition of Gary Lauck has shown the sacrifice of interna-
tional law in the guise of good policy. The neo-nazi threat, especially in
Europe, has risen to a level of public outrage. Denmark, who has
amended its neo-nazi laws to reflect greater concern for the issue, had
both domestic and international pressure to hand-over Lauck to the Ger-
man authorities. However, in so doing, the German and Danish govern-
ments have weakened the authority international law can play in unifying
the region. While increased cooperation in the prevention and punish-
ment of neo-nazis should be applauded as a legitimate goal, the inability
to utilize legal means in which to do it creates both regret and concern in
the author. By reverting extradition to the level of diplomatic relations,
the door is flung open to reap the uncertainty of political climate. This is
particularly troubling in its far-reaching implications. Both international
terrorism and drug trafficking are crimes which threaten the security of
the world community. For the most part, the response to these crimes has
been directed through legal channels. 4" By forming new laws or revital-
izing pre-existing laws, the world community is given both a mandate and
direction in which to coordinate its efforts to prevent these threats.
Sovereigns must likewise push extradition law forward by promoting
new treaties and agreements which codify a general agreement on the
terms and objectives of the world community for two reasons. First, in
order for countries to rely upon international criminal law, the terms and
restrictions of extradition must be known to all parties. Second, the indi-
viduals rights must be protected from overly anxious attempts at expedi-
ent extradition. In an era of instantaneous international communications
and daily travel, it is unwise to leave the citizen of the world to be ex-
posed to the conflicting laws of every nation on earth without clear stan-
dards of extradition.
46. See, e.g., Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Air-
craft, signed Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768, 704 U.N.T.S. 219; Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons,
Including Diplomatic Agents, adopted Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532, G.A.
Res. 3166, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) 146, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1974); U.N. Convention
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, adopted by consensus
Dec. 19, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 493 (1989).
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